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Abstract
We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. We show that
there is an advantage to entering late in the market, and that the last agent to enter the
market will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching, extending the results
of Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechla´rova´ (2002) for the marriage model. We also
discuss the relation between sequential bargaining and a possible alternative formulation
based on the NTU Shapley value.
JEL classification numbers: C71,C78
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Sequential Entry in Many-to-one Matching Markets
Elette Boyle Federico Echenique ∗
1 Introduction
We study sequential bargaining in many-to-one matching markets. Consider a two-sided
matching market, such as a labor market. Suppose that agents sequentially enter the
market, and that each time an agent arrives, the market adjusts to produce a new stable
matching. Following Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechla´rova´ (2002), we study a
simplified model of sequential entry, in which participants enter the market one at a
time, in some arbitrary given order. When an agent enters the market, there is an
adjustment from the existing provisional matching to a new one. The entrant proposes
to match with her most preferred partner. This can leave a previously paired agent
unmatched, in which case this agent would propose to her most preferred partner, and
so on.
We show that sequential entry results in an advantage to entering late into the market.
Other factors remaining equal, it is always better to enter later than earlier. Further,
the last agent to enter receives his/her best possible outcome of all stable outcomes for
the market. Our results generalize similar results obtained for the one-to-one (marriage)
market by Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechla´rova´ (2002). Biro´, Cechla´rova´, and
Fleiner (2007) present a different generalization, to a model which includes the roommate
problem.
We also show that sequential entry violates a basic monotonicity axiom: one agent
may raise in others’ preferences but receive, on average, worse outcomes. Monotonicity
is behind standard solutions for random-order bargaining in other environments (Young,
1985). So sequential entry in matching seems rather special.
We work with a separable version of the many-to-one model, the “college admissions”
model. We reduce the college admissions model to a one-to-one model by treating each
position in a college as an individual agent, each of which can match to at most one
student. This isomorphism between models is nontrivial in our case. The ordering of
identical college positions yields an additional degree of freedom in the market that is
lost when entry is sequential. We show, however, that this difficulty can be overcome.
∗We thank Peter Biro´ and Utku U¨nver for their advice on the related literature.
We also discuss the possible definitions of a Shapley value for matching markets. The
sequential entry model can be thought of as a random-order bargaining solution. This
raises the question of how the expected outcome of the sequential entry compares to the
Shapley value. We show that the Shapley value is generally not well defined in matching
problems. This finding may be related to the failure of monotonicity described above.
We should mention that Ma (1996) and Klaus and Klijn (2006) also study sequential
entry. They present examples to show that not all stable matchings can be obtained under
sequential entry, and to discuss the validity of certain axioms. Other related papers are
Cantala (2004) and Kojima and U¨nver (2007).
In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 contains our results on sequential entry
for the many-to-one model. We discuss the Shapley value in Section 4, and coalitional
monotonicity in Section 5.
2 The Model
We present the standard marriage and college-admissions model. See Roth and So-
tomayor (1990) for a detailed exposition of matching markets. The marriage model plays
a central role in this study since our results utilize a reduction of the college-admissions
model to the marriage model, and because our results for the Shapley value hold for the
marriage model.
2.1 Marriage model
We first describe the one-to-one marriage model. Let M and W be finite, disjoint sets.
We will refer to the elements of M as men and the elements of W as women. A generic
element of M ∪W is an agent.
A preference relation is a linear, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. A
preference relation for a man m ∈ M , denoted >m, is understood to be over the set
W ∪{m}. Similarly, >w denotes a preference relation over M ∪{w}. A preference profile
is a list P of preference relations for men and women, i.e.
P =
(
(>m)m∈M , (>w)w∈W
)
.
We will assume that no man or woman is indifferent over two different partners; i.e., if
w 6= w′, then either w >m w′ or w′ >m w. Preferences with this property are called
strict. Denote by ≥m the weak relation associated to >m. That is, w′ ≥m w if either
w′ = w or w′ >m w. The definition of ≥w is analogous.
The triple (M,W,P ) describes an instance of the marriage model. We shall often
consider instances obtained by deleting some agents from (M,W,P ): we denote by
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(M,W,P ;M ′,W ′) the instance (M ′,W ′, P ′), with M ′ ⊆ M , W ′ ⊆ W , and where P ′
is obtained from P by restricting agents’ preferences to the relevant subsets of potential
partners.
A matching is a function µ :M ∪W →M ∪W such that, for all m ∈M and w ∈ W ,
µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m} and µ(w) ∈ M ∪ {w}, and m = µ (w) if and only if w = µ (m). If
w = µ(m) we say that w and m are matched in µ. If a = µ(a), for a ∈ M ∪W , we say
that a is single. Say that an agent is acceptable to a if a prefers to match with the agent
over being single.
A matching µ is defined to be individually rational if, for any m and w, µ(m)≥m m
and µ(w)≥w w; i.e. all matched agents have acceptable matches. Say that a pair (w,m)
blocks µ if w 6= µ(m), w >m µ(m), and m >w µ(w). A matching is stable if it is
individually rational and there is no pair that blocks it. Denote by S(M,W,P ) the set
of all stable matchings in the market (M,W,P ).
2.2 College admissions
Let C and S be finite, disjoint sets of agents. We call the elements of C colleges and
the elements of S students. Suppose that each college C ∈ C has a quota qC ≥ 0 of
available positions. College C can then accept at most qC students, and the remaining
positions will remain unfilled. Thus, the potential student bodies for college C are sets
A ∪ B, where |A ∪B| = qC , A ⊆ S and B has qC − |A| copies of the element C of C
(corresponding to the unfilled positions). Formally speaking, A∪B is an unordered list;
see Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Let DC be the set of all potential student bodies for C
and endow C with a preference relation >C over DC . We assume that >C satisfies the
property that, for any D ∈ DC , if a ∈ D and a′ /∈ D, then
((D ∪ {a′}) \ {a}) >C D if and only if {a′} >C {a} .
This property is called responsiveness.
Each student s ∈ S is similarly endowed with a preference relation ≥s over C ∪ {s}.
Let P be the list of all colleges’ and students’ preferences. Then the data on a college-
admissions market is collected in (C, S, P ).
A many-to-one matching is a function µ on C∪S such that, for all C ∈ C and s ∈ S,
µ(C) ∈ DC , µ(s) ∈ C ∪ {s}, and s ∈ µ(C) if and only if µ(s) = C.
A matching µ is individually rational if µ(s) = C implies that C >s s and {s} >C {C}.
A matching is stable if it is individually rational and there is no pair (C, s) such that
C >s µ(s) and s >C a for some a ∈ µ(C).
We use a (well known) reduction of college admissions to marriage markets. The
reduction works by considering each available position in a college as a separate agent.
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In order to maintain strict preferences, the first position of a college is set to be preferred
by all students over the second position of the college, over the third, and so on (Roth
and Sotomayor, 1990).
Formally, given an instance of the college-admission model, (C, S, P ), we construct
an instance of the marriage model, (M,W,P ) by setting M = S; taking W to be the set
containing qC copies, c1, . . . cqC of college C for each C ∈ C; and defining preferences of
men and women such that each cj has the same preferences as C over singleton students
(now men), and each s ∈M has preferences >s over copies of different colleges, satisfying
for each C, for all s ∈ M , ci >s cj if and only if i < j. We use the notation c ∈ C to
denote one of the copies of C ∈ C.
2.3 Sequential entry
We present a model of sequential entry due to Blum and Rothblum (2002) (following ideas
of Roth and Vande Vate (1990) and Blum, Roth, and Rothblum (1997)). The setup is
a variant on the classic Gale-Shapley stable matching algorithm. We first present the
model within the marriage model, and then its extension to the college-admissions model.
The Gale-Shapley algorithm (Gale and Shapley, 1962) takes as input an instance of
the marriage model and gives a matching as output. It starts with all men being “active”
and all women being provisionally single, and it iterates the following subroutine: Let
each active man propose to match with his preferred woman, of those women he has
not already proposed to. Each woman selects her preferred man between her provisional
match and those who proposed to her during the round. At the conclusion of this round,
take each woman to be provisionally matched to the man she selects. A man becomes
active after a round if he was rejected by a woman during the round and there are still
acceptable women to whom he has not yet proposed. Exit the subroutine. The algorithm
terminates when there are no more active men.
Gale and Shapley show that the outcome µ of the algorithm is a stable matching. In
fact it is the men-optimal stable matching, in the sense that all men prefer their match
in µ over their match in any other stable matching, and all women have the opposite
preference. Similarly, the version of the algorithm with women proposing to men produces
the women-optimal stable matching.
We study a straightforward modification of the Gale-Shapley algorithm: Take as input
to the subroutine an instance (M,W,P ), and a matching µ in (M,W,P ;M \ {m} ,W )
with m ∈ M . The output will be a matching in (M,W,P ). Start with m being the
only “active” agent and all women provisionally matched to their matches in µ. Repeat
the subroutine in the Gale-Shapley algorithm (with only male agents proposing) until
no men are active. Denote the resulting matching by h(M,W,P ;m,µ). Analogously,
h(M,W,P ;w, µ) would be the matching that results from the above algorithm with
women proposing, and agent w starting as active.
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An ordering of the agents is an ordered list of the elements of M ∪W . We denote by
R the set of all orderings, and by ρ a generic ordering. Let ρk denote the ordered list of
the first k elements of ρ, ρkM the set of men in ρ
k and ρkW the set of women in ρ
k. Let ρk
denote the kth agent in ρ, equivalently, the last element of ρk.
Let ρ ∈ R and consider the recursive procedure where we let µk+1 = h(ρkM , ρkW , P ; ρk, µk),
starting from the matching µ1(ρ1) = ρ1. Let f(ρ) be the matching that results after the
last agent has been added.
For the college-admissions market (C, S, P ), we let R be the set of all orderings of
students and positions in colleges. So the orderings in R are the orderings of M ∪W in
the marriage market associated to (C, S, P ). We define f(ρ) as the matching that results
from the procedure we have described, but applied to the associated marriage model.
3 Main Results
We show that there is a strong late-mover advantage in sequential bargaining over many-
to-one matching outcomes. Indeed, in the extreme case, the final agent to enter the mar-
ket will receive his or her best partner in a stable matching. The result in item 1 of Theo-
rem 1 was shown for the marriage model by Blum and Rothblum (2002) and Cechla´rova´
(2002), and generalized to a single-party roommate model by Biro´, Cechla´rova´, and
Fleiner (2007). A weaker version of the statement in item 2 is shown Blum and Roth-
blum (2002) and Biro´, Cechla´rova´, and Fleiner (2007) for the marriage model.
Theorem 1. Let (C, S, P ) be an instance of the college admissions model. Let ρ ∈ R be
an ordering of the students and college positions. Then
1. f(ρ) is a stable matching and the last agent a in ρ receives his/her preferred partner
in any stable matching; if a is the position of a college C, then C receives his/her
preferred student body in any stable matching.
2. Let ρ′ be an ordering in which agent b occurs later than in ρ, and all agents that
follow b’s position in ρ′ coincide in both orderings. If b = s ∈ S is a student, then
f(ρ′)(s) ≥s f(ρ)(s); if b is a position of a college C ∈ C, then f(ρ′)(C) ≥C f(ρ)(C).
The proof of Theorem 1 requires some preliminary results. The first are two lemmas
from Blum and Rothblum (2002).1 These hold for the marriage market. Lemma 4 is a
new result, which holds on the college admissions model.
Lemma 2. Consider an instance of the marriage market. For any matching µ in the
market (M,W,P ;M \ {m} ,W ), the resulting matching h(M,W,P ;m,µ) is stable in
(M,W,P ), and is preferred by all the men to any other stable matching in which the
women are at least as well off as in µ. Similarly for h(M,W,P ;w, µ).
1Lemma 2 is Theorem A.6, and Lemma 3 is Lemma 2.4 in Blum and Rothblum (2002).
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Lemma 3. Consider an instance of the marriage market. Let µ = f(ρ) and µ′ = f(ρ′),
for two orderings ρ and ρ′. If µ′(b) ≥b µ(b) for some agent b, then this relation is
preserved when an additional player is added onto the end of both orderings. That is, if
ρˆ and ρˆ′ are the orderings obtained by adding the same agent at the end of ρ and ρ′, we
have f(ρˆ′)(b) ≥b f(ρˆ)(b).
We omit the proofs of lemmas 2 and 3.
Lemma 4. Consider an instance of the college-admissions model (C, S, P ) and fix a
matching µ. When a college position enters the market, the resulting matching is the
college-optimal (C-optimal) stable matching such that no student is worse off than in
µ; when a student enters the market, the resulting matching is the student-optimal (S-
optimal) stable matching such that no college is worse off than in µ.
Proof. From Lemma 2, the claim holds for students and individual college positions in the
one-to-one market model. The C-optimal matching of a set of stable matchings S (when
it exists) is the matching µC such that µC(C) ≥C µ(C) ∀C ∈ C,∀µ ∈ S. By Theorem
5.27 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), this condition is equivalent to µC(ci) ≥ci µ(ci) ∀
college positions ci, ∀µ ∈ S. This implies the college position-optimal matching s.t. no
student is worse off is precisely the C-optimal matching s.t. no student is worse off.
Consider now the second assertion. No college worse off in matching µ1 than in µ2 means
that µ1(C) ≥C µ2(C) ∀C ∈ C. Again from Theorem 5.27 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990),
this occurs if and only if µ1(ci) ≥ci µ2(ci) ∀ college positions ci, implying the set of stable
matchings such that no college is worse off is precisely the set of stable matchings such
that no college position is worse off.
Lemma 5. Consider the one-to-one model of the many-to-one market with students and
individual college positions. If two positions ci and cj of the same college C are switched
in an ordering ρ, then the resulting stable matching is unaffected.
Proof. Suppose ci and cj appear in the mth and nth positions of the ordering ρ1, respec-
tively; we may assume without loss of generality that m < n. Let ρ2 be the ordering with
ci and cj switched. For every i ≥ 1, let (C(i)1 , S(i)1 , P (i)1 ) and (C(i)2 , S(i)2 , P (i)2 ) be the ith re-
striction submarkets containing the first i players appearing in ρ1 and ρ2, and maintaining
all relevant preferences. Take pi : (C ∩C(i)2 )→ (C ∩C(i)1 ) to be the unique bijection such
that ck <s cl ⇔ pi(ck) <s pi(cl) for each student s ∈ S (Note that, from the construction
of the market model, ck <s0 cl for some s0 ∈ S and ck, cl ∈ C iff ck <s cl ∀s ∈ S). Extend
pi to the map φ : C
(i)
2 → C(i)1 by φ(c) = c ∀c /∈ C. By the construction of the market
model, a student prefers all positions of a college over all positions of a less preferred
college; thus, the relation ck <s cl ⇔ φ(ck) <s φ(cl) holds for all students s ∈ S and for
all c ∈ C.
Let µ
(i)
1 be a matching in (C
(i)
1 , S
(i)
1 , P
(i)
1 ), and define the matching µ
(i)
2 in (C
(i)
2 , S
(i)
2 , P
(i)
2 )
by µ
(i)
2 (c) = µ
(i)
1 (φ(c)) ∀c ∈ C(i)1 and µ(i)2 (s) = s ∀s s.t. µ(i)1 (s) = s. Show that µ(i)1 is a
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stable matching iff µ
(i)
2 is a stable matching. Suppose, to the contrary, there exists a block-
ing pair (cˆ, sˆ) in µ
(i)
2 . Then, sˆ >cˆ µ
(i)
2 (cˆ) and cˆ >sˆ µ
(i)
2 (sˆ). By properties of φ, we have
that φ(cˆ) >sˆ φ(µ
(i)
2 (sˆ)). From the construction of µ
(i)
2 , µ
(i)
2 (µ
(i)
2 (sˆ)) = µ
(i)
1 (φ(µ
(i)
2 (sˆ)));
since we also have trivially that µ
(i)
2 (µ
(i)
2 (sˆ)) = sˆ = µ
(i)
1 (µ
(i)
1 (sˆ)) and as µ
(i)
1 is an in-
jective mapping, this implies φ(µ
(i)
2 (sˆ)) = µ
(i)
1 (sˆ). So we have φ(cˆ) >sˆ µ
(i)
1 (sˆ). Now,
sˆ >cˆ µ
(i)
2 (cˆ) = µ
(i)
1 (φ(cˆ)). If cˆ /∈ C, then φ(c) = c, implying sˆ >φ(cˆ) µ(i)1 (φ(cˆ)). If cˆ ∈ C,
then φ(cˆ) ∈ C as well. Since all positions of college C share the same preferences, we
again have that sˆ >φ(cˆ) µ
(i)
1 (φ(cˆ)). Therefore, (sˆ, φ(cˆ)) form a blocking pair in µ
(i)
1 , con-
tradicting the stability of µ
(i)
1 . An identical argument, utilizing φ
−1 in the place of φ, can
be used to show that µ
(i)
2 stable implies µ
(i)
1 is stable. Thus, one matching is stable iff
the other matching is stable.
This result implies that for each i, the set of stable matchings in (C
(i)
1 , S
(i)
1 , P
(i)
1 ) is in
bijection with those in (C
(i)
2 , S
(i)
2 , P
(i)
2 ), and are the same up to the labeling of the positions
of college C. We wish to show that when a new agent enters both markets, µ
(i)
1 is the
resulting matching in (C
(i)
1 , S
(i)
1 , P
(i)
1 ) iff µ
(i)
2 is the resulting matching in (C
(i)
2 , S
(i)
2 , P
(i)
2 ).
Suppose a new college position enters both markets. For each student s ∈ S, µ(i+1)2 (s) ≥s
µ
(i)
2 (s) ⇔ φ(µ(i+1)2 (s)) ≥s φ(µ(i)2 (s)) (from properties of φ) ⇔ µ(i+1)1 (s) ≥s µ(i)1 (s) (since
µ
(j)
1 (s) = φ(µ
(j)
2 (s)) from above). That is, no student is worse off in µ
(i+1)
1 than the previ-
ous matching (µ
(i)
1 ) iff no student is worse off in the analogue matching µ
(i+1)
2 than in µ
(i)
2 .
Now, suppose a new student enters both markets. µ
(i+1)
2 (c) ≥c µ(i)2 (c) ⇔ µ(i+1)1 (φ(c)) ≥c
µ
(i)
1 (φ(c)) (by definition of µ
(i)
2 (s)) ⇔ µ(i+1)1 (φ(c)) ≥φ(c) µ(i)1 (φ(c)) (since c and φ(c) are
positions of the same college and all positions of a college share the same preferences). As
φ is a bijection between C
(i)
1 and C
(i)
2 , this holds for all c ∈ C(i)2 iff µ(i+1)1 (c′) ≥c′ µ(i)1 (c′)
for all c′ ∈ C(i)1 . That is, no college position is worse off in µ(i+1)1 than in the previous
matching iff the same holds for µ
(i+1)
2 .
We now show that µ2 is S-optimal (resp, C-optimal) of a set of stable matchings in
(C
(i)
2 , S
(i)
2 , P
(i)
2 ) iff µ1 is S-optimal (resp, C-optimal) of the corresponding set of stable
matchings in (C
(i)
1 , S
(i)
1 , P
(i)
1 ). Consider two matchings µ2 and µ˜2 in (C
(i)
2 , S
(i)
2 , P
(i)
2 ).
µ2(s) ≥s µ˜2(s) ⇔ φ(µ2(s)) ≥s φ(µ˜2(s)) ⇔ µ1(s) ≥s µ˜1(s) in (C(i)1 , S(i)1 , P (i)1 ). Similarly,
µ2(c) ≥c µ˜2(c) ∀c ∈ C(i)2 ⇔ µ1(φ(c)) ≥c µ˜1(φ(c)) ∀c ∈ C(i)2 ⇔ µ1(c′) ≥c′ µ˜1(c′) ∀c′ ∈
C
(i)
1 .
Therefore, by Lemma 4, whenever a student or a college position enters the market
in (C
(i)
1 , S
(i)
1 , P
(i)
1 ) and (C
(i)
2 , S
(i)
2 , P
(i)
2 ), the resultant matching in the former is µ
(i+1)
1 if
and only if the resulting matching in the latter is µ
(i+1)
2 . Continuing inductively, we see
that the final matchings resulting from the two orderings ρ1 and ρ2 must be the same
up to permutation of the positions of college C. However, in order for a matching µ to
be stable, it must be that the most preferred student in µ(C) is paired with the first
position in C, the second most preferred student with the second position in C, and so
on. Hence, since both µ1 and µ2 are stable matchings, it must be that µ1 = µ2.
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Proof of Theorem 1. We first prove item 1 using that the result is true for the marriage
market associated to (C, S, P ).
The result is immediate when a student is the last to enter. Suppose that the last
agent in ρ is a position of a college C. Let µ be the college-optimal stable matching in
(C, S, P ). By Lemma 4, f(ρ) is stable. If µ(C) >C f(ρ)(C) there must be a position
c ∈ C such that s is c’s partner in µ, s′ is c’s partner in f(ρ), and s >c s′ (see Roth and
Sotomayor (1990)). Now consider the order ρ′ which only differs from ρ in that the last
position of ρ switches places with c. By Lemma 5, f(ρ) = f(ρ′), the fact that c does not
obtain its best partner in a stable matching contradicts the statement of Theorem 1 for
the marriage market.
We now prove item 1. For the marriage market, our statement is more general than the
one in Blum and Rothblum (2002), so we present a separate proof first for the marriage
market.
Consider an instance of the marriage market, (M,W,P ). Let n be the number of
agents. Suppose agent b is in the kth position in the ordering ρ′, so b = ρ′k. By Lemma 2,
then, b’s partner in the matching f(ρ′k) is his/her best stable partner in any stable
matching in (M,W,P ; ρ′M , ρ
′
W ). But since the agents coming after b coincide for both ρ
and ρ′, the agents coming before b also coincide. So ρM = ρ′M and ρW = ρ
′
W and hence
b prefers his/her partner in f(ρ′k) over his/her partner in f(ρk).
Now proceed by induction, using Lemma 3: For each i ≥ k, f(ρ′i)(b) ≥b f(ρi)(b)
implies that f(ρ′i+1)(b) ≥b f(ρi+1)(b) implies that, as we are adding the same agent to
both orderings.
We now prove the result for the college-admissions model. For a ∈ S, the result
follows from the argument for the marriage market. Consider then a = c0, a position in
college C. By Theorem 1, µ1(c0) ≥c0 µ2(c0). By Theorem 5.27 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990), it remains to show that µ1(cj) ≥cj µ2(cj) ∀j 6= 0 such that cj ∈ C. Suppose c0
appears n-th in the ordering ρ1. For every i ≥ n, let (C(i), S(i), P (i)) be the ith restriction
submarket containing only the first i players appearing in ρ1 (and ρ2), and maintaining
all relevant preferences. Let µ
(i)
1 and µ
(i)
2 be the stable matchings resulting from the first
i players in ρ1 and ρ2 entering the market.
Suppose cj ∈ C appears mth in ρ1, with m ≥ n. From item 1 in Theorem 1, since
cj appears last of the m players in ρ1, cj will receive the best possible stable student in
the matching µ
(m)
1 . ⇒ µ(m)1 (cj) ≥cj µ(m)2 (cj). By Lemma 3 this relation is preserved
as each of the following players enters the market. Continuing inductively, we have
µ1(cj) ≥cj µ2(cj). (Note that for m > n, this argument holds also in the opposite
direction, implying that µ1(cj) = µ2(cj)).
Suppose, then, cj ∈ C appears lth in ρ1, with l < n. From Lemma 5, ρ1 will yield the
same stable matching as the ordering ρˆ1 with the positions of c0 and cj switched. As cj
appears later in ρˆ1 than ρ2, we have by item 2 in Theorem 1, ρ2(cj) ≤cj ρˆ1(cj) = ρ1(cj).
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It has been shown that µ1(cj) ≥cj µ2(cj) ∀j such that cj ∈ C. Therefore, µ1(C) ≥C
µ2(C).
4 The Shapley Value in Matching Markets
We have discussed one approach to sequential random-order bargaining in matching
problems. It is natural to consider a different approach, using the Shapley value. In this
section, we focus on the marriage model.
The Shapley value is the best-known prediction in random-order bargaining, and its
extension to non-transferable utility (NTU) games (Shapley, 1969) is in principle applica-
ble to matching problems. While the Shapley value for transferable-utility (TU) games
is the result of a simple calculation, in NTU games it requires a fixed-point property,
and is not guaranteed to exist for arbitrary NTU games (it can also have problematic
properties, as illustrated in Roth (1980)).
As we show below, in the NTU games that result from a matching market, the Shapley
value will not generally be well defined. Indeed, it does not seem to exist beyond a set of
very symmetric situations. We view the problems with the Shapley value as one reason
to be interested in the f outcomes discussed in Section 3.
4.1 Preliminaries.
A transferable utility (TU) game is a pair (N, v) composed of a set of players N and a
real-valued function v : 2N → R on the power set of N , satisfying v(∅) = 0. A coalition
is a nonempty subset of N . For a coalition S of players within N , v(S) associates a value
of worth to that particular coalition.
Definition 6. The Shapley value of a TU game (N, v) is the vector whose ith component
is given by
φi(v) =
∑
S⊆N
|S|!(n− |S| − 1)!
n!
(v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)),
for each player i ∈ N .
A non-transferable utility (NTU) game is a pair (N, V ) composed of a set N and a
function V taking each subset S of N to a subset of Rs (where s = |S|) satisfying the
following conditions:
(i) V (S) = ∅ iff S = ∅
(ii) If x = (x1, . . . , xs) ∈ V (S) and y = (y1, . . . , ys) ∈ Rs with yx ≤ xi for each i, then
y ∈ V (S)
(iii) V (S) is a closed subset of Rs
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(iv) V (S) ∩ (x+ R+) is bounded for all x ∈ Rs
The s-dimensional vectors in V (S) represent possible ways of distributing the worth
of the subset S amongst its s members. An example of an NTU game is a two-sided
matching market, where players assign quantitative utility values to each possible partner.
We now define the Shapley value of a NTU game (N, V ) (Shapley, 1969).
Definition 7. For λ ∈ Rn, let vλ(S) = sup{λ · x|x ∈ V (S)}. If this supremum is finite
for all S, then vλ defines a TU game. A Shapley value of (N, V ) is a point y in V¯ (N)
(the closure of the image of N under V ) such that there exists a positive vector λ with
vλ defined and λy = φ(vλ), where φ yields the Shapley value of the TU game vλ.
See Aumann (1985) or Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003) for an exposition.
4.2 Matching Markets as NTU Games.
We define a NTU game to model the matching market as follows. Fix an instance of
a matching market (M,W,P ) and fix utilities representing the preferences in P ; so, for
example, for a man m we have um : W ∪ {m} → R such that w ≥m w′ if and only if
um(w) ≥ um(m′). Without loss of generality, we choose utilities so that um(m) = 0 and
uw(w) = 0; that is, being single gives zero utility for all m ∈ M and w ∈ W . Note that,
in this setup with numerical utilities, we have the potential for quantitative preference
effects instead of the outcome relying solely on relative preferences. For instance, an
agent now has the capacity to rank two players nearly the same, or to really like or
dislike a potential match.
Let N =M ∪W be the set of all players in the matching market. For each coalition
S ⊆ N of players, consider all the possible matchings between the players involved. Each
player has a utility associated with being paired to the other players, so each matching
yields a vector y of utilities corresponding to the involved players. Take V (S) to be the
set of all vectors x ∈ Rs such that xi ≤ yi for all components i of the vectors for at
least one utility vector y. Note that V (∅) = ∅ and for all S 6= ∅, there exists at least
one matching (specifically, the matching corresponding to the zero vector, in which every
player remains single), implying V (S) 6= ∅. By construction, the defined function V also
satisfies conditions (ii), (iii), and (iv) above.
A matching market is uneven if the number of men differs from the number of women.
We also say that all agents are acceptable if, for every agent, being single receives lower
utility than being with anyone of the opposite sex.
Proposition 8. If (M,W,P ) is an uneven matching market in which all agents are
acceptable, a Shapley value does not exist for the NTU game induced by (M,W,P ).
Proof. Let (N, V ) be the NTU game associated to (M,W,P ). Fix one λ ∈ Rn. From the
construction of (N,V), vλ(S ∪ {p})− vλ(S) ≥ 0 for all players p ∈ N . That is, no player
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can decrease the value of a coalition when joining it. As all players are acceptable to at
least one agent of the opposite party, ∀p ∈ N,∃q ∈ N such that vλ({p, q})− vλ({q}) > 0.
This implies φ(vλ)p > 0 for each player p. However, since the parties are uneven, for any
matching µ of the players of N , at least one player must remain single. Thus, y ∈ V (N)
implies yi ≤ 0 for some i ∈ N . This means that φ(vλ) /∈ V (N). Hence, since λ was
arbitrary, there cannot exist an NTU Shapley value in V (N).
The proof of Proposition 8 suggests that an NTU Shapley value may not exist in any
but the most symmetric matching situations. We proceed to show that, in the case that
a Shapley value does exist, it must correspond to a valid matching of the players in the
market. Further, in any market where there exists a single matching µ preferred over
all other matchings by every player, the NTU Shapley value of the market is the utility
vector corresponding to µ.
Proposition 9. If an NTU Shapley value exists in a one-to-one matching market, then
it must correspond to the utility vector of a matching.
Proof. Fix a matching market (M,W,P ) and let (N, V ) be the associated NTU game.
Suppose y ∈ Rn is an NTU Shapley value of (N, V ), obtained as the TU Shapley value
of vλ. By efficiency of the TU Shapley value (e.g. see Peleg and Sudho¨lter (2003)),∑
i φ(vλ)i = vλ(N). Now, by definition, vλ(N) = sup{x · λ|x ∈ N}. Since φ(vλ)i = yiλi,
we have sup{x · λ|x ∈ V (N)} = ∑i yiλi. ∑i yiλi = y · λ by definition. Now, V (N) is
defined as the smallest comprehensive set in Rn that contains the utility vectors of all
possible matchings. Thus, y must itself be the utility vector corresponding to a valid
matching.
Proposition 10. Suppose there is a matching µ in (M,W,P ) such that, for all matchings
ν and agents a, µ(a) ≥a ν(a). Then there is exactly one Shapley value of the associated
NTU game, and it is the vector of utilities corresponding to µ.
Proof. Let y0 be the utility vector corresponding to the matching µ. As µ(a) ≥a ν(a)
for all possible matchings ν, the NTU game (N, V ) associated with the matching market
(M,W,P ) is convex. As a consequence, the set of NTU Shapley values must be nonempty
(see Theorem 6.3.1 in Ichiishi (1983)). From the proof of Proposition 9, if y is a Shapley
value, then y · λ = sup{x · λ|x ∈ V (N)}. In this case, as V (N) = {x ∈ RN |x ≤ y0},
this implies the only possible Shapley value is y0 itself. Therefore, y0 must be the unique
NTU Shapley value of the market.
5 Coalitional monotonicity
The matching outcomes f(ρ) can, by analogy with the Shapley value, be used to cal-
culate “average” utilities when we think of each ordering ρ as equally likely. Although
these values may not correspond to an actual matching, they could serve as a measure of
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bargaining power each player brings to the market. We now show, however, that the re-
sulting average utilities are not monotonic with respect to increased utility opportunities.
This finding is probably surprising, as the source of increased utility comes from agents
rising in the preferences of the opposite sex. It is also pessimistic about the possibility of
axiomatizing f(ρ) using a variation of the systems of axioms used for the Shapley value
(Young, 1985).
A value is a function φ mapping NTU games (N, V ) into vectors in Rn. Say that a
value satisfies coalitional monotonicity if, for all players p and for all functions V and W ,
if it holds that both V (S) ⊇ W (S) ∀S ⊆ N with p ∈ S and V (T ) =W (T ) ∀T ⊆ N with
p /∈ T , then it implies that φp(N, V ) ≥ φp(N,W ) (Young, 1985).
Proposition 11. The value obtained by averaging f(ρ) over all ρ ∈ R does not satisfy
coalitional monotonicity.
Proof. Show by counterexample. Consider the six-player market
({m1,m2,m3} , {w1, w2, w3} , P ) where P is given by the following utility represen-
tations:
Man ∅ w1 w2 w3
m1 0 3 2 1
m2 0 2 3 1
m3 0 1 2 3
Woman ∅ m1 m2 m3
w1 0 2 3 1
w2 0 2 1 3
w3 0 1 2 3
By averaging f(ρ) over all ρ ∈ R we obtain approximately the vector of utilities
(2.42, 2.42, 3.00, 2.58, 1.58, 3.00).2
Consider now if w3 changes her preferences to prefer m1 as depicted below:
Man ∅ w1 w2 w3
m1 0 3 2 1
m2 0 2 3 1
m3 0 1 2 3
Woman ∅ m1 m2 m3
w1 0 2 3 1
w2 0 2 1 3
w3 0 4 2 3
If modeled as a NTU game with value function V (as described above), we see that
V ({m1, w3}) will increase from {x ∈ R2|x ≤ (1, 1)} to {x ∈ R2|x ≤ (1, 4)} after this
change. Also, for every coalition S s.t. m1 ∈ S, V (S) will remain constant or increase,
and every coalition T with m1 /∈ T will remain unaffected.
However, the new vector obtained by averaging f(ρ) is
(2.00, 2.42, 2.58, 2.58, 2.00, 3.42).
Note that the component corresponding to m1 decreased from 2.42 to 2.00.
2The C++ code, written by Elette Boyle, for making these calculations can be downloaded from
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~fede/wp/
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